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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CONTINUED NEED FOR THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
EXAMINING SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION

JENIGH J. GARRETT*
We have a way in America of wanting to be ‘rid’ of problems. It is not so
much a desire to reach the best and largest solution as it is to clean the board
and start a new game . . . . [To] not want to solve it, [to] not want to
understand it, [to] want simply to be done with it and hear the last of it. [This
1
is the worst] of all possible attitudes . . . .

I. INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 dramatically changed America’s political
process. Racial diversity in Congress has substantially increased and the
country elected the first Black President of the United States in 2008.
According to some, President Obama’s election provides convincing evidence
that America is now in a post-racial political era. With discrimination in the
area of voting a thing of the past, the argument goes, Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act—which requires federal review of voting changes in certain
jurisdictions before they an become law—is an antiquated remedy to a
nonexistent problem.2
The 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, however,
revealed that “a bleaker side of the picture . . . exists” despite the success of the
Voting Rights Act.3 In over 16,000 pages of evidence supporting the
reauthorization of Section 5, Congress learned that minorities in Section 5covered jurisdictions continue to face voting hurdles enacted with either a
discriminatory intent or effect. When the congressional record in support of
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (“LDF”). It has been an
honor to serve as an attorney at LDF and pursue a more inclusive democracy. I would like to
thank my colleagues at LDF for their inspiration and commitment. I especially want to thank
Ryan P. Haygood for his substantive suggestions and comments to this article and Debo
Adegbile, who offered suggestions and shared resources supporting the research of this article. I
also want to thank Lawrence D. Bobo and Samuel Spital, for their formal and informal comments
and suggestions.
1. W.E.B. DuBois, The Color Line Belts the World, COLLIER’S: THE NAT’L WKLY, Oct.
20, 1906, at 30.
2. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
3. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 (1980).
77
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the 2006 reauthorization closed, the evidence and testimony showed that
Section 5 continues to be not only the heart of the Voting Rights Act, but one
of the most effective measures to prevent discrimination in voting.
Notwithstanding the actual evidence of discrimination in the 2006
reauthorization record, the argument that America is post-racial and, therefore,
post-Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was one aspect of Appellant’s opening
Supreme Court brief in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number
One v. Holder (hereinafter “NAMUDNO”),4 the first constitutional challenge to
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act after its 2006 reauthorization. Plaintiff
argued, among other things, that the election of President Obama was evidence
that discrimination is a thing of the past and the evidence of discrimination in
the 2006 Voting Rights Act reauthorization record did not support
congressional reauthorization.5
NAMUDNO boldly placed Congress’s ability to function within its express
constitutional authority before the Court and anticipated that the Court would
overturn the 2006 reauthorization.
In an 8-1 opinion, however, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional
question by ruling that a political sub-unit could seek exemption from the
requirements of Section 5 under the Act’s bailout provisions.6 The ruling was
a victory for the Act. But dicta in both the majority and dissenting opinions
reiterated constitutional concerns articulated by those who opposed the 2006
reauthorization of the Act.7
With little in the opinion preventing future constitutional challenges,
covered jurisdictions quickly responded. A little over a year after the Court
issued its ruling three separate jurisdictions (Alabama, Georgia, and North
Carolina) filed cases challenging Section 5’s constitutionality. These cases
have relied on some of the same assumptions and arguments raised in
NAMUDNO: the evidence of second-generation discrimination in the 2006
record of reauthorization—voting barriers that do not bar minorities from the
political process in a wholesale way but prevents the full participation of
minorities in the political process—cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The 2006 congressional record in support of reauthorization, however,
evidenced the opposite. Section 5 has worked against voting discrimination,
including second-generation barriers, in covered jurisdictions since the 1982
reauthorization. Over the course of more than ten hearings Congress analyzed
and reviewed evidence of discrimination in voting from 1982-2006. The
evidence and testimony in support of reauthorization revealed that

4. See Appellant’s Brief at 1–13, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No.
08-322).
5. See id. at 1.
6. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2513, 2516–17.
7. Id. at 2512, 2525.
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notwithstanding the success of some minority candidates from covered
jurisdictions, second-generation barriers continue to prevent the full promise of
the Voting Rights Act and Section 5 continues to be the most effective
preventative measure against racial discrimination in voting.8
This article challenges the assertion that second-generation discrimination
does not evidence the continued need for Section 5. Part II examines the
mechanics of the Voting Rights Act and Section 5 in particular. Part III
examines how second-generation barriers harm minorities. Part IV reviews
examples of persistent second-generation discriminatory barriers in the 2006
reauthorization record and previous reauthorization records. Part V concludes
that Congress was within its authority when it determined that secondgeneration barriers continued to persistently harm minority voters in Section 5
covered jurisdictions.
II. THE MECHANICS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The Voting Rights Act is complex legislation with interacting measures for
combating discrimination against minority voters.9 The Section 5 preclearance
requirement is a tailored remedy designed to address the persistent nature of
voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions. Section 5 requires all or part of
sixteen states to submit all proposed changes to any voting practice or
procedure to the United States Attorney General or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance before the voting change
can become law:
Whenever a State or political subdivision . . . shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting . . . such State or subdivision may institute an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a
declaratory judgment that such qualification . . . neither has the purpose nor
will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color . . . [or] . . . such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or
procedure may be enforced without such [court] proceeding if the . . .
procedure has been submitted . . . to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such
10
submission . . . .

8. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246,
§ 2(b)(2), 120 Stat. 577.
9. Among other things, the Act bans literacy tests in covered jurisdictions, prohibits
discrimination that has the intent or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote nationwide,
authorized federal examiners to conduct voter registration, and authorizes the Attorney General to
assign persons who may be federal officers to observe how elections are conducted and report
their observations to the Attorney General of the United States. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)-(b), 1973a(b), 1973b, 1973e (repealed June 27, 2006), 1973f (2006).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
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The language of the Act is flexible and applies to a broad range of
discriminatory mechanisms.11 The Act is not concerned with a “simple
inventory of voting procedures but the reality of changed practices as they
affect Black voters” in subtle and obvious ways.12
III. UNDERSTANDING HOW SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATORY
BARRIERS HARM MINORITY VOTERS
Section 5 applies to both first and second-generation barriers. Firstgeneration barriers are discriminatory stratagems that result in the wholesale
exclusion of minorities from the political process.13 Second-generation
barriers, on the other hand, allow formal access to the franchise but dilute
minority voting strength by limiting the effect that minority votes could have
on the political process.14 Second-generation discriminatory barriers are often
more sophisticated than the facially discriminatory mechanisms that preceded
them.15 Nonetheless, the minority voting experience in covered jurisdictions

11. The Act reaches a wide range of laws that can subvert the effect of the Voting Rights Act
in covered jurisdictions. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969). The actions
of the Mississippi legislature provide one example of how states were determined to control the
impact of federal laws regulating voting as a direct reaction to the registration requirements of the
Voting Rights Act. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 21 (1968).
In 1966, one year after the Act’s enactment, the Mississippi legislature introduced approximately
30 bills relating to elections or the political process in regular and special sessions of the
Mississippi legislature. Id. at 22. One statute approved by the legislature allowed voters to
decide, by petition, if members of county boards of education would be elected at-large when the
1965 practice was the election of countywide representatives from five districts. Id. Another
statute provided that members of the county governing body, which were elected from five single
member districts, could exercise a local option and elect members of the county governing body
at large. Id. Most sponsors of the bill were from counties where the majority population of at
least one district, or the entire county, was Black. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222,
227–31 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing the subversion of federal voting laws before Section 5’s
enactment).
12. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 565; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971); Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973).
13. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS 3 (2004); see also Pamela S.
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution
Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 18384 (1989).
14. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1991) (“[F]irst generation [barriers are]
direct impediments to electoral participation [and include] registration and voting barriers. Once
[first generation] obstacles were surmounted . . . the focus shifted to second-generation, indirect
structural barriers such as at large, vote-diluting elections.”).
15. See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV.
523, 55253 (1973). In addition, testimony before Congress during the 1970 reauthorization
showed that jurisdictions quickly adopted second-generation barriers once the Voting Rights Act
became law. See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538 Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 255 (1970) (statement of Clarence
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shows how both the wholesale exclusion of voters and second-generation
barriers achieve the same discriminatory result.16
A.

Second Generation Barriers Prevent Minorities from Electing Their
Candidates of Choice

Secondary barriers are discriminatory because minorities are unable to
recognize their voting strength even though they are allowed formal access to
the political process.17 What constitutes a second-generation barrier is broad18

Mitchell, Wash. Ass’n of the NAACP) (“Immediately after passage of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act the Mississippi Legislature . . . passed twelve bills and resolutions which substantially altered
the state’s election laws. Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina have all resorted to
various devices to slow down [or] prevent registration, voting and election to public office.
These devices include abolishing offices, switching to so-called ‘at large elections,’ consolidation
of counties, ‘full slate voting,’ barring or intimidating poll watchers and giving misleading
information to would-be voters.”).
16. The wholesale nature of first-generation discrimination creates an absolute barrier to
formal participation at the first stage of the political process. See Karlan, supra note 13, at
18384. Until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, first-generation barriers were successfully
used to bar minority access to the political process, notwithstanding the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
1960, and 1964. Voting Rights Act: Hearing on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong. 14 (1965) (statement of Stanley Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“In
almost any other field, once the basic law is enacted by Congress and its constitutionality is
upheld, those subject to it, accept it. In this field, however, the battle must be fought again and
again in county after county.”). When the Voting Rights Act outlawed first-generation
discriminatory barriers to registration by requiring the registration of voters under federal law,
second-generation barriers were enacted in response. See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing
on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 15, at 194 (statement of Vernon Jordan, Director, Voter
Education Project, Southern Regional Council to the National Liberties Clearinghouse)
(describing voting changes related to residency requirements, registration deadlines, hours for
registration, and the location of places for registration); id. at 255 (statement of Clarence Mitchell,
Wash. Ass’n of the NAACP) (noting in 1967, the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP did a
statewide check regarding registration conditions. They found that “[i]nsufficient time to register
and inconvenience of the place of registration were the most common complaints. In Lancaster
County it was necessary to make an appointment to register. In Southampton County registration
was on Thursdays only. In Halifax County the registration dates were set at the ‘convenience of
the registrar.’” In another county, a registrar left to go play golf). Second-generation barriers
continued to hinder the registration of minority voters between 1982 and 2006. See, e.g., Voting
Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 299–301 (2006) (Baldwin
County, AL) (purge and reidentification of voters); id. at 712–715 (State of Georgia) (reduction
of the minimum number of permanent satellite voter registration locations to be established by
certain counties and the elimination of satellite registration during 18 months of the state’s two
year election cycle); id. at 1599–1605 (State of Mississippi) (administrative plan for
implementation of National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)).
17. See Derfner, supra note 15, at 524, 55357 (listing examples of second-generation
barriers); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 183839 (1992).
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and includes straightforward barriers, like moving a polling place,19 to the
complex manipulation of district lines. Whether straightforward or complex,
however, second-generation barriers can “render the abstract right to vote
meaningless” because the elective structure that should allow for fair
participation in the political process prevents it.20
During previous reauthorizations, Congress received evidence and
testimony revealing that both blatant and subtly effective discriminatory
mechanisms impacted the minority voting experience in covered jurisdictions.
Changes impacting the adoption or application of aggregate voting structures,
for instance, became one of the most frequently used second-generation
responses to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.21 Aggregate voting
structures allow populations to collectively exercise their political power and
determine the outcome of an election.22 Several second-generation barriers,
however, serve to limit the collective impact of the choices minority voters
make at the voting booth when aggregating their votes. These barriers include
the creation of discriminatory electoral districts,23 adopting a majority vote
requirement when elections are held at-large,24 annexations,25 and anti-single
shot voting laws.26
18. Even changes concerning the eligibility of candidates and ministerial acts such as
changes to election schedules and filing periods can prevent minorities from electing a candidate
of choice in a discriminatory manner. See Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969); NAACP
v. Hampton Cnty. Election Comm’n, 470 U.S. 166, 174–181 (1985); see also WASHINGTON
RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SURVIVAL OF DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN
THE SOUTH 140 (1972). In 1966, only one year after the enactment of Section 5, the Mississippi
legislature proposed a change that increased the requirements for qualifying as an independent
candidate. Id. Specifically the number of signatures required to qualify for a statewide office
increased from 1,000 to 10,000. Id. When the change was submitted for preclearance the
Attorney General objected. Id.
19. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971) (finding that a seemingly innocuous
change, such as the location of a polling place, can be used to prevent access to the franchise
notwithstanding the registration of voters because “accessibility, prominence, facilities, and prior
notice of the polling place’s location” affect a person’s ability to vote on Election Day).
20. See id.; STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS & ELECTORAL
POLITICS 1965-1982 at 217 (1985) (finding second-generation barriers render the vote “relatively
useless, because of the way the rules of the game are rigged . . . .”) (citations omitted).
21. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1724 n.83 (1992-1993).
22. Id. at 1712–13.
23. See Stanley A. Haplin Jr. & Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern
State Legislative Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act,
22 J. PUB. L. 37, 42–49 (1973).
24. DAVID HUNTER, FEDERAL REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES: HOW TO USE SECTION 5 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 38–39 (1974), reprinted in Extension of the Voting Rights Act:
Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3427, and H.R. 350 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1510–1511 (1975); see also
Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
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The record evidence of both the use and impact of second-generation
barriers during the 25 years since the 1982 reauthorization led Congress to
conclude that racial discrimination in voting continued to prevent the equal
participation of minorities in the political process in covered jurisdictions.27
Moreover, the testimony and evidence during the 2006 reauthorization
revealed that minorities in covered jurisdictions were subject to secondgeneration electoral structures that enhanced discrimination against minority
voters at a higher rate than voters in non-covered jurisdictions.28
B.

The NAMUDNO Dissent Failed to Recognize Second-Generation
Barriers and How They Obstruct Democracy

The dissenting opinion in NAMUDNO argued that the evidence of secondgeneration discrimination in the 2006 congressional record was insufficient to
support the reauthorization of Section 5. According to the dissent, the days of
grandfather clauses, discriminatory tests, and systematic campaigns to
disfranchise Blacks “are gone.”29 Covered jurisdictions, the dissent continued,
do not make a “concerted effort” to defy the Constitution in an “unremitting
and ingenious” manner.30 As a result, Section 5 is nothing more than
“[p]unishment for long past sins . . . [with no] legitimate basis for imposing a
forward-looking preventative measure that has already served its purpose.”31
The dissent attacked second-generation barriers directly and argued that
evidence of “‘second-generation barriers constructed to prevent minority
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 594 (1982) (statement of Ed Brown, Dist.
Coordinator for the NAACP, Camilla and Mitchell Cntys., Georgia) (noting Americus, Georgia,
for instance, changed their voting system for mayoral and council elections from plurality to
majority vote without submitting the change for preclearance. The majority vote requirement was
implemented in the following two elections and used to exclude African Americans from office).
25. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3427, and
H.R. 350, supra note 24, at 1513–15.
26. Id. at 1511.
27. The House Committee Report concluded that “voting changes devised by covered
jurisdictions resemble those techniques and methods used in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1982
including: enacting discriminatory appointed positions; relocating polling places; enacting
discriminatory annexations and deannexations; setting numbered posts; and changing elections
from single member district to at-large voting and implementing majority vote requirements.”
H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 36 (2006).
28. To Examine the Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 974 (2005); see
also Ellen Katz, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 643, 655–56 (2006).
29. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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voters from fully participating in the electoral process . . . [was] not probative
of the type of purposeful discrimination that prompted Congress to enact §5 in
1965 . . . [,] and is not a problem unique to the South.”32
Of importance is how the dissent redefines second-generation barriers as
racially polarized voting, Section 5 enforcement actions (which are filed when
covered jurisdictions fail to submit a voting change for preclearance), federal
examiner and observer coverage, and lawsuits filed under §§ 2 and 4 of the
Voting Rights Act.33 The dissent goes on to state that “such evidence bears no
resemblance to the record initially supporting Section 5, and is insufficient to
sustain such an extraordinary remedy. In sum, evidence of second-generation
barriers cannot compare to the prevalent and pervasive voting discrimination
of the 1960s.”34
This characterization of the congressional records in support of the
enactment and reauthorizations of the Voting Rights Act, however, does not
reflect the history of the Voting Rights Act.35 Covered jurisdictions responded
to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by implementing secondgeneration barriers to voting.36 While Congress anticipated the use of new
measures to curtail minority voting strength after covered jurisdictions were
required to register voters under federal law, the frequent use of secondgeneration discriminatory barriers led to numerous cases and significant
testimony before Congress of their impact.37 Second-generation barriers were,
and continue to be, a direct reaction to the promise of the Voting Rights Act.38

32. Id. at 2526.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 15, 16, 18, 24.
36. Congress learned that covered jurisdictions barraged their electoral processes with
measures designed to prevent newly registered Black voters from exercising the natural result of
their voting strength after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The method of
discrimination took “the form of switching to at-large elections where . . . voting strength is
concentrated in particular election districts, facilitating the consolidation of . . . counties, and
redrawing the lines of districts to divide concentrations of [Black] voting strength.” Voting
Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 15, at 17 (statement of
Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights).
37. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390 n.8 (1971). While facially neutral, these
mechanisms interacted with the history of discrimination in the United States and the race of the
voter to deny or dilute the right to vote on account of race. See Derfner, supra note 15, at 523.
During the 1970 extension one Congressman observed,
resistance to progress has been more subtle and more effective than I thought possible. A
whole arsenal of racist weapons has been perfected. Boundary lines have been
gerrymandered, elections have been switched to an at-large basis, counties have been
consolidated, elective offices have been abolished where Blacks had a chance of winning,
the appointment process has been substituted for the elective process, election officials
have withheld the necessary information for voting or running for office, and both
physical and economic intimidation have been employed. Section 5 was intended to
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IV. THE CONTINUED NEED FOR SECTION 5: EXAMINING CONTINUED SECONDGENERATION DISCRIMINATION
The 2006 Voting Rights Act reauthorization revealed that the work of
eliminating discrimination in voting remains undone. This section reviews the
details of how actions in covered jurisdictions were discriminatory and how,
over the course of three reauthorizations, second-generation discriminatory
barriers were consistently used to prevent an equal opportunity for minorities
to participate in the political process.
A.

Discriminatory Responses to Minority Voting Strength

When population or registration increases or decreases threaten the racial
composition of a governmental or political unit, voting changes can be
designed to limit and control the political impact of those changes in a
discriminatory manner. During the previous reauthorizations, Congress
learned that covered jurisdictions reacted to the registration of Black voters and
the impact of their voting strength by enacting second-generation
discriminatory barriers. When Congress revisited conduct in covered
jurisdictions in 2006, the evidence and testimony in support of reauthorization
showed that such discriminatory changes persisted in covered jurisdictions.
This section provides a sample of the record evidence of second-generation
barriers amassed during the 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006 reauthorizations of
Section 5 and highlights how evidence of modified and familiar secondgeneration stratagems were boldly implemented and/or repeated.

prevent the use of most of these devices. But apparently the States rarely obeyed the
mandate of that section . . . .
Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 15, at 3–4
(statement of Rep. William McCulloch).
38. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 19–131; James
Blacksher, Edward Still, Jon M. Greenbaum, Nick Quinton, Cullen Brown & Royal Dumas,
Voting Rights in Alabama: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249 (2008); James
Thomas Tucker, Rodolfo Espino, Tara Brite, Shannon Conley, Ben Horowitz, Zak Walter &
Shon Zelman, Voting Rights in Arizona: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 283 (2008);
Robert A. Kengle, Voting Rights in Georgia: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 367
(2008); Debo P. Adegbile, Voting Rights in Louisiana: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC.
JUST. 413 (2008); Robert McDuff, The Voting Rights Act and Mississippi: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 475 (2008); Juan Cartagena, Voting Rights in New York City: 1982-2006,
17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 501 (2008); Anita S. Earls, Emily Wynes & LeeAnne Quatrucci,
Voting Rights in North Carolina: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 577 (2008); John
C. Ruoff & Herbert E. Buhl, Voting Rights in South Carolina: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. &
SOC. JUST. 643 (2008); Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Criselda G. Rivas, Voting Rights in Texas:
1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 713 (2008); Anita S. Earls, Kara Millonzi, Oni
Seliski & Torrey Dixon, Voting Rights in Virginia: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST.
761 (2008).
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1. Annexations and Cancelled Elections
The annexation process is one type of second-generation barrier repeatedly
used to discriminate against minority voters. During previous reauthorizations,
Congress learned that covered jurisdictions would circumvent adjacent
concentrated minority populations in favor of adjacent concentrated White
populations when annexing areas.39 The selective annexation process would
impact minority voters on the verge of exercising their political strength
because White voters would not support the same candidate of choice as Black
voters.40
Lake Providence, Louisiana, for example, was “substantially evenly
divided” along racial lines and elected its governing body at-large in 1972.41
The Town received annexation requests from two adjacent areas to the town at
the same time, one with a predominately Black population and one with a
predominately White population.42 The town annexed the White area but
rejected the request from the Black area.43 Rejecting the annexation request
from the Black population had the effect of creating a White majority, which
could control the outcome of the at-large elections.44 The Attorney General
objected to the change under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.45
Another example comes from the Town of McClellanville, South Carolina
in 1974. There, town officials told Black residents who resided in a
concentrated area adjacent to the town that any formal request for annexation
would be rejected because it would dramatically alter the race of the town.46
When the request for Section 5 preclearance was submitted to the Attorney

39. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note
15, at 47 (statement of Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights)
(explaining how annexations and redistricting diluted minority voting strength); see also City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 238 (statement of
James Clyburn, Comm’r, South Carolina Human Affairs Comm’n) (“Counties with a high
percentage of minority voters are invariably grouped with counties that have a high percentage of
White voters for purpose of electing our state Senators. Again, the obvious purpose is to dilute
the effect of the Black vote. Fairfield is combined with Richland; Williamsburg and Marion with
Florence and Horry; Georgetown with Charleston; Dillon with Chesterfield and Marlboro;
Clarendon with Sumter; Edgefield and Allendale with Aiken and Lexington; and Calhoun and
Orangeburg with Dorchester. To add insult to injury, the Senate representatives are elected by
numbered seats within multi-member/multi-county districts, thereby ensuring the continuation of
an all-White Senatorial body.”).
40. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49–50 (1986).
41. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y Gen., to George F. Fox, Jr. (Dec. 1, 1972).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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General, the town erroneously represented that the adjacent Black population
did not prefer annexation.47 When the Attorney General learned of the false
statements in the submission he found that the town denied annexation for a
racial purpose and objected to the change under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.48
During the 2006 reauthorization Congress learned that these types of
discriminatory annexation processes continued in covered jurisdictions.49
Grenada, Mississippi, for instance, drew an objection when it cancelled its
election and carried out a racially selective annexation policy with the
“purpose to maintain and strengthen White control of a City on the verge of
becoming majority Black.”50 Similarly, Augusta, Georgia drew an objection to
its “annexation policy center[ed] on a racial quota system.”51 Annexations to
the city required corresponding numbers of Black and White populations to
“avoid increasing the city’s Black population percentage.”52 Augusta even
went so far as to conduct door-to-door surveys to identify White residential
areas for annexation.53
2. The Abandonment of Electoral Structures that Provide Opportunities
to Elect Candidates of Choice
Another way covered jurisdictions responded to foreseeable increases in
the electoral strength of minority populations was to abandon plans that offered
more opportunities for minority populations to elect candidates of choice. In
many cases, single-member districts provide one way for minorities to elect
candidates of choice. Changes from single-member districts to at-large or
multi-member districts, which can be designed to eliminate opportunities to
elect candidates of choice, were common in the first few years following
passage of the Act.54 In 2006, Congress learned that such activity continued.

47. Letter from David L. Norman, supra note 41.
48. See Letter from J. Stanly Pottinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Phillip A. Middleton,
Attorney (May 6, 1974).
49. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 1781–83, 1915–16, 2505–07 (noting Congress learned jurisdictions continued to
implement the same types of discriminatory annexations to control the racial demographics of the
population); id. at 305–06, 319–20.
50. Id. at 1606–12.
51. Id. at 642.
52. Id.
53. Id. The City was also sued under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Voting Rights
Act: Evidence of Continued Need: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1516 n.78 (2006). When the settlement in the Section 2
litigation resulted in a new method of election that was nondiscriminatory, the Attorney General
withdrew his objection. Id.
54. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 21–24; WASHINGTON RESEARCH
PROJECT, supra note 18, at 109–121; see, e.g., Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y
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Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana, for instance, had ten police jury wards
with a Black majority population in six of the wards.55 When Blacks were able
to elect candidates of choice, the ten-ward system created a Black majority on
the police jury.56 The Parish proposed eliminating one of the single-member
wards by combining it with two other wards.57 The resulting multi-member
district, however, did not give minorities an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of choice and would eliminate the Black majority on the police
jury.58 The Attorney General objected under Section 5 of the Act.59
During the 2006 reauthorization Congress learned that the abandonment of
fairer electoral structures for discriminatory electoral structures also continued.
The City of Freeport, Texas, for instance, proposed the abandonment of singlemember districts once “Latinos were able to elect candidates of choice” under
a single-member plan.60 The Attorney General objected under Section 5.61
The testimony and evidence in support of reauthorization showed that even
when covered jurisdictions adopted fairer electoral structures only after
litigation, they would seek to abandon the electoral structure that provided an
opportunity to elect. The Haskell Consolidated Independent School District,
for instance, sought to revert to at-large elections after Section 2 litigation
required single-member districts.62 The Attorney General objected to the
change and explained that the race-neutral reason proffered by the district for
the change was pretextual.63

Gen., to Leonard E. Yokum, District Att’y, (May 14, 1971); Letter from David L. Norman,
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Leslie Hall, Assistant Att’y Gen. (Mar. 20, 1972). See also Extension of
the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, supra
note 24, at 1779 (statement of Paul Alexander, Acting Gen. Counsel, U.S. Comm’n on Civil
Rights) (“In one jurisdiction in Alabama the at-large election system for electing members to the
city commission coupled with majority vote and staggered term requirements reportedly have a
discriminatory effect on minority voting strength. The city commission in this jurisdiction is
composed of three members who are elected at large. One of the commissioners also serves as
mayor. Despite the fact that the jurisdiction at one time had a near majority Black population and
in 1980 was 33 percent Black, no Black has ever been elected to the city commission. Between
1969 and 1978, four Black candidates ran for places on the commission. All were defeated.
Currently all three members of the city commission live in the predominantly White north side of
the city.”).
55. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Samuel C. Cashio, Dist. Att’y
(Aug. 9, 1971).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 2291–92, 2529.
61. Id. at 2290.
62. Id. at 2513–14.
63. Id. at 2513–15.
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And some covered jurisdictions simply refused to adopt fairer electoral
structures outright. This occurred in Cleveland, Mississippi, where the school
district delayed the adoption of single-member districts and cancelled its 1989
school board election when a state law required the adoption of single member
districts.64 When the Cleveland School District finally submitted a singlemember redistricting plan that created five citywide districts, the Attorney
General precleared the change with the understanding that a special election
would be scheduled in November 1990 under the single-member plan.65
Six months later the school district proposed the abandonment of its
redistricting plan and the suspension of the November 1990 election until the
1990 Census results were available.66 When the Attorney General objected to
these new changes the school district attempted to circumvent the objection by
obtaining a state court order authorizing both the abandonment of the singlemember plan and canceling of the November 1990 school board elections.67
The school district then asked the Attorney General to reconsider and withdraw
its objection in light of the state court opinion.68 Instead, the Attorney General
authorized the filing of a lawsuit to enforce Section 5 and hold a special
election for school board trustees because the school district chose to obtain a
state court order, allegedly authorizing the abandonment of the plan, instead of
implementing the new election method required under state law and precleared
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.69
3. Discriminatory Redistricting Plans
The number of redistricting plans designed to prevent minorities from
exercising their voting strength is significant.70 The following examples
merely provide some of the details concerning the nature of discrimination
when redistricting, another second-generation barrier that manipulates the
voting strength of minority voting populations, occurs in covered
jurisdictions.71

64. Id. at 1395–98.
65. Id.
66. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 1395–98.
67. Id. at 1405–07.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 238 (statement of James Clyburn, Comm’r, South
Carolina Human Affairs Comm’n); Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and
Purpose: Hearing, supra note 16, at 310–12, 327–29, 388–90, 397–99, 972–73, 1414–16, 1935–
37, 1983–85, 2082–84.
71. See, e.g., Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 371–75 (statement of Michael Brown, Field Dir. for
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a. Statewide Legislative Plans
Over the course of previous reauthorizations Congress reviewed several
incidents of discrimination through redistricting, another second-generation
barrier. In some instances discriminatory statewide plans were repeatedly
adopted by state legislatures. The redistricting experience in Alabama
provides such an example. Over the course of previous reauthorizations the
evidence and testimony before Congress revealed that the Alabama legislature
failed to redistrict without discrimination after the 1970 Census despite a court
order.72 When a federal court was required to intervene, the state submitted
three plans but all of them had population deviations above 24 percent and
employed multi-member districts.73 The District Court rejected the proposed
plans and created a plan with single-member districts.74
In 1980, Alabama had the second opportunity to draw its districts without
discrimination. The redistricting plan created by the legislature, however,
reduced the Black population in ten urban districts and eliminated four Black
majority districts in rural counties, which significantly altered minority voting
strength.75 The Attorney General found that the actions of the state legislature
were unnecessary to satisfy “any legitimate governmental interest.”76 The
Attorney General objected to the 1980 redistricting plan.77
In 1990, the Alabama legislature had the opportunity to draw its
congressional districts without discrimination. Nonetheless, when the state
submitted its congressional redistricting plan for preclearance, the Attorney
General had reason to believe that the plan was created with the
“predisposition on the part of the state political leadership to limit Black voting
potential to a single district.”78 As a result, the Attorney General objected to
the 1990 congressional redistricting plan.79
Over the course of several reauthorizations, the evidence and testimony
before Congress showed that Alabama did not stand alone in creating statewide
redistricting plans that discriminated against minorities.80

Branches, Va. State Conference of NAACP) (explaining how redistricting harmed minority
voters in Virginia).
72. See Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924, 931–32 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
73. Id. at 933–34.
74. Id. at 934–39.
75. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 264–66.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 266.
78. Id. at 385–87.
79. Id. at 266.
80. Statewide redistricting plans from Louisiana, for instance, incurred an objection shortly
after adoption of the Act. One of the first occurred in 1971, when the state created a district
where Blacks were packed together until their population reached 91.2 percent of the district.
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b. Local Redistricting Plans
Local governments did not fare much better than states when creating
redistricting plans over the course of Voting Rights Act coverage. Less than
ten years after the Voting Rights Act was enacted, the redistricting plan for the
City of Many, Louisiana packed the Black population into a single majorityminority district with a 100 percent Black population.81 The remaining Black
population was divided among several districts so they were unable to elect a
candidate of choice.82 Both cracking—the process of fracturing minorities
across several districts—and packing—the process of concentrating minorities
in a single district—are second-generation barriers.83 The Attorney General
interposed an objection and the City of Many had to create a new redistricting
plan.84
In 2006, the evidence and testimony before Congress revealed that local
covered jurisdictions continued to redistrict in a discriminatory manner. The
City of McDonough, for instance, submitted a redistricting plan that
impermissibly packed Black voters, who constituted over 70 percent of the
population in an otherwise compact geographic area, into a single district.85
The City then divided the rest of the Black population between two districts in
a way that prevented their opportunity to elect a candidate of choice.86 The

WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 18, at 108. In fact, packing in the district was so
significant that the district was overpopulated by more than 5 percent, as compared to other
districts. Id.; Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Jack P.F. Gramillion, Att’y
Gen. (Aug. 20, 1971); Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 452 (statement of Charles Cotrell, Professor, St.
Mary’s University). In 2006, Congress learned that the majority of Louisiana’s objections since
1982 were to redistricting plans. Adegbile, supra note 38, at 436–38. Moreover, not one
statewide plan submitted by the Louisiana legislature originally received preclearance. See id. at
419. Most recently, the 2000 plan for the Louisiana House of Representatives completely
eliminated a majority-minority district and reduced the Black population in several other districts
in the New Orleans area even though the 2000 census indicated the Black population remained
the same. See id. at 446–48. The State submitted the plan for preclearance in the District Court
of the District of Columbia and admitted that it eliminated the district in a conscious effort to
limit African-American voting strength in the New Orleans area and to increase electoral
opportunities for White voters. See id. The State withdrew its submission only after evidence
revealed that it did not follow its own redistricting guidelines when creating the district. See id.;
see also Earls, Millonzi, Seliski & Dixon, supra note 38, at 788–89.
81. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Att’y Gen., to Virginia G. Godfrey, Mayor, City of
Many (Apr. 13, 1976).
82. Id.
83. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993); HUNTER, supra note 24, at
1505–06.
84. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, supra note 81.
85. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 2082–84.
86. Id. at 582.
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Attorney General objected and determined that the 1982 redistricting plan
“appeared calculated to carve up the city’s Black voting strength among
several districts in an unnatural and wholly unnecessary way.”87 When the city
resubmitted its plan it retained the fragmentation identified in the 1982 plan
and eliminated the one district that provided an opportunity to elect.88 The
Attorney General determined that the second plan, like the first, was drafted
without a nonracial justification “for so facially suspect a redistricting.”89
c. Repeated Adoption of Discriminatory Measures
Finally, some covered jurisdictions repeatedly adopted discriminatory
structures to control the governance of certain bodies by non-minorities.
Sumter County, South Carolina provides just one example of how some
covered jurisdictions repeatedly enacted a variety of discriminatory secondgeneration barriers.90
Until 1967 South Carolina’s governor would appoint members to the
Sumter County Council based on the legislative delegation’s
recommendation.91 After litigation required that the State create a redistricting
plan which would create opportunities for a Black state senator to control
recommendations for gubernatorial appointments to the Sumter County
governing body, the state legislature created a seven-member Sumter County
Council to be elected at large.92 Sumter County held five elections under this
new, unprecleared system before submitting it for preclearance in 1976.93 In
1984, a court found the at-large method of election to the Sumter County
Council violated Section 5.94 For about 15 years, elections to the Sumter
County Council proceeded without objection, but in 1992 Sumter County
enacted a redistricting plan drawn with the purpose of eliminating one of the
four majority-Black districts on the seven-member council.95 The Attorney
General interposed another objection.96
The Sumter County Council, however, was not the only governing body in
the Sumter area impacted by discriminatory voting changes.97 The City of

87. Id. at 612.
88. Id. at 613.
89. Id.
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 56 (2006).
91. See Cnty. Council of Sumter Cnty. v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D.D.C 1984).
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 39.
95. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 2082–83.
96. Id. at 2084.
97. See Voting Rights Act: Hearing on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, H.R. 3112 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 591 (1983)
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Sumter (which lies in Sumter County) proposed 57 annexations, 45 of which
drew objections from the Attorney General.98 The Attorney General noted
that, despite the city’s large Black population, no Black had been elected to
city council in recent times because of racially polarized voting and the city’s
at-large election system.99 The proposed annexations “seem[ed] calculated to
take in only Whites while excluding predominately Black areas,” and
“enhance[d] the ability of the White majority to exclude Blacks totally from
participation in the governing of the city[.]”100
B.

The Continuous Nature of Voting Discrimination Through SecondGeneration Barriers

Without a doubt, the immediate response to the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act, which required the registration of minority voters after nearly 100
years of disfranchisement, was the enactment of second-generation barriers.101
Although registration rates increased after the enactment of the Voting Rights
Act and overt acts of violence do not occur as frequently as they did in 1965,
traditional and new responses to minority voting strength—second-generation
barriers—continue to be used to prevent the full participation of minority
voters.102 Moreover, the record before Congress in 2006 showed that secondgeneration barriers continue to be used with the intent to discriminate.103

(statement of Ed Brown, Dist. Coordinator, NAACP) (discussing voting discrimination by the
Sumter County Board of Education).
98. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra
note 16, at 1915–16.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1916.
101. See, e.g, supra notes 15, 16, 18, 24, 39, 54, 55, 70, 71; see also Miss. State Chapter,
Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1251–55, 1268 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (explaining that
Mississippi’s dual registration requirement was enacted in the 1890s as part of the “Mississippi
Plan” with the intent to deny Blacks the right to vote, along with Mississippi’s poll tax and
literacy test, shortly after the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. The discriminatory
consequences of the Mississippi Plan had its intended impact for nearly 100 years but in 1987
Black voters challenged the legality of Mississippi’s dual registration system and a federal district
court found that the dual registration requirement was enacted for a discriminatory purpose,
continued to have a discriminatory effect, and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); see
also Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997) (explaining that four years after the 1987 decision in
Operation Push v. Allain, Mississippi established its dual registration system again by requiring
separate registration for federal and state elections and refused to seek preclearance. Individual
voters brought a Section 5 enforcement action, and the Court unanimously held that preclearance
was required).
102. Compare supra note 38, with Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504, 2525–26 (2009).
103. Peyton McCrary et al., The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court
Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275 (2006), reprinted in
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The actual record of second-generation discrimination in the 2006 record
of reauthorization, therefore, is much different than the characterization of the
record by the dissent in NAMUDNO. The dissent’s failure to acknowledge the
existence of the extensive second-generation barriers in the record, and the use
of such barriers since 1965, belies the argument that second-generation barriers
are “not probative of the type of purposeful discrimination that prompted
Congress to enact Section 5.”104 To the contrary, Congress anticipated secondgeneration barriers—although it could not contemplate every form—when it
created the Voting Rights Act, which covered all voting changes.105
Arguments that attempt to draw a bright-line between first- and secondgeneration discriminatory voting barriers move us further away from
eliminating discrimination in voting because they ignore the existence of
otherwise discriminatory acts. This was not the intent of Congress in passing
the Voting Rights Act and it is far from the requirements of the Reconstruction
Amendments.106 Persistent discrimination, like the repetitive use of secondgeneration barriers in covered jurisdictions, harms both the experience of
minorities in the political process and democracy in general.
V. SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION HARMS DEMOCRACY
Congress did not reach its decision to reauthorize Section 5 based on
episodic or isolated incidents.107 Instead, it evaluated the persistence of
discriminatory second-generation barriers between 1982 and 2006.108 And, as
explained more fully above, this record of continued discrimination was
reviewed against a historical backdrop of both first- and second-generation
discrimination.109
The encounter at the Edmund Pettus Bridge and the wholesale exclusion of
minority voters from the franchise is not the only way discrimination in voting
can persist or the only form of voting discrimination Section 5 was designed to
address. A careful analysis of the appropriateness of Congress’s decision to

Voting Rights Act: Section 5 Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 96, 180–81 (2006).
104. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 621 (1965).
105. See generally Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
106. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325–26 (1966).
107. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246,
§§ 2(b), 2(4), 120 Stat. 577. Contra Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2526.
108. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246,
§§ 2(b), 2(4), 120 Stat. 577.
109. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 56 (“[D]espite previous reauthorizations, the problem of
voting discrimination justified reauthorization. In light of the considerable record before it, the
Committee has a duty to maintain the protections afforded by the temporary provisions by
reauthorizing these vital provisions.”).
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reauthorize Section 5 in 2006, therefore, must not ignore both the historical
context of the record in support of the 2006 reauthorization and the evidence of
the repeated use of second-generation barriers that the 2006 record reveals. In
fact, even the dissent in NAMUDNO recognizes that discrimination in voting
occurs along a continuum.110
Discrimination in voting, whether sophisticated, subtle, or violent, is
discrimination.111 Each form of racial discrimination is a part of the history of
voting discrimination in the United States and each form is equally offensive to
our democracy. Efforts to render the use of second-generation barriers
insignificant because it differs in form from first-generation barriers disregards
the fact that both second and first generation barriers prevent the equal
opportunity of minorities to participate in the political process.
In fact, Congress learned that over sixty percent of the administrative
decisions objecting to voting changes under Section 5 included discriminatory
intent as a basis for the objection.112 Congress concluded that “without the
remedies available from the VRA’s temporary provisions, the injury to
minority citizens and their right to the electoral franchise will be
The discrimination before Congress during the 2006
significant.”113
reauthorization, therefore, does not evidence the end of discrimination in
voting but a part of America’s long struggle toward a voting process free from
discrimination.
In reauthorizing Section 5, unlike other cases where the Court has
overruled congressional judgment, Congress is acting to protect a fundamental
right under authority expressly granted by the Constitution.114 When Congress
acts to protect fundamental rights, courts have deferred to congressional
findings of constitutional violations and should continue to do so.115
VI. CONCLUSION
When Congress reauthorized Section 5 in 2006, it met its obligation to
protect our democracy from persistent unconstitutional discrimination, an
offense that was unresolved for far too long.116 The record in support of

110. See id. at 2521–23.
111. JOHN LEWIS, WALKING WITH THE WIND 315 (1998) (“A large number of White Selma
residents were becoming embarrassed and concerned over [Sheriff Clark’s violent] actions. They
weren’t eager to give Black people the right to vote, but they were certain there were more
‘civilized’ ways of keeping us off the rolls.”).
112. Supra note 103.
113. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 56 (2006).
114. Compare Board of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), with City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
115. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003); Lopez v. Monterey
County, 525 U.S. 266, 284–88 (1999).
116. See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE 37–39 (1999).
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reauthorization showed that between 1982 and 2006 second-generation barriers
were frequently adopted to prevent minority voters from electing candidates of
choice. Moreover, covered jurisdictions continued to enact discriminatory
voting changes and electoral structures with discriminatory intent. Congress
correctly determined that the task of eliminating repetitive and persistent
voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions was incomplete and refused to
abandon the promises of our democracy while this work remained undone.

